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As the Internet grows in size and users, many aspects of our lives start to fold around its 
center. This calls for more preventive measures that guard against malicious actors and 
threat cases. Tor strives to cover one aspect by promising its users a low-latency, 
anonymity protocol that guards against those actors. In recent years, many researches 
focused on identifying the end servers Tor users intend to reach. Among those, Website 
Fingerprinting (WF) and Traffic Analysis are considered the most effective due to ease of 
implementation, lower resources requirements, and promising results in both open and 
closed world. The efforts to thwart such attacks is solely based on increasing the active 
circuits by encouraging more users to utilize Tor, and thus increasing the level of 
multiplexing that occurs at Tor relays. However, these approaches fail dramatically when 
attackers target lowly utilized relays, or when rigid regimes focus on the sole link 
between an end user and the entry node. In this research, we aim to unearth the details of 
Tor multiplexing, and show the extent to which it aids in defending such attacks. We also 
propose to introduce randomization to Tor by displaying three algorithms to randomize 







 یاسر سلیمان العقل :االسم الكامل
 
 التحلیل األمني لخوارزمیات التعدد والتشكیل في بروتوكول تور :عنوان الرسالة
 
 أمن المعلومات التخصص:
 
 تاریخ الدرجة العلمیة: ینایر ٢٠١٨
 
كلما تكبر شبكة االنترنت، ویزداد عدد مستخدمیھا، یزداد اعتمادنا علیھا، وتصبح محور حیاتنا الیومیة. لھذا دعت 
الحاجة إلى ابتكار وإنتاج العدید من وسائل الحمایة لمقاومة العدد المتزاید من المستخدمین الخبیثین، والتصدي لحاالت 
التھدید السیبرانیة. تور (بروتوكول التوجیھ البصلي) یسعى جاھدا لسد ھذا االحتیاج عن طریق تقدیم بروتوكول سریع 
االستجابة، یعد مستخدمیھ بإخفاء ھویاتھم الحقیقیة خلف توجیھ متعدد لكي یحمیھم من ھؤالء المستخدمین الخبیثین. في 
السنوات الماضیة القریبة، ركز الباحثون جھودھم الستخالص المواقع التي یقوم مستخدمون تور بزیارتھا بطرق 
متعددة، لیس لمساعدة المستخدمین الخبیثین، بل البتكار طرق الدفاع أیضا. أحد أشھر ھذه الطرق، ھو "تبصیم 
المواقع"، ویعد األكثر فعالیة نظرا لسھولة تنفیذ ھذا الھجوم، انخفاض الموارد الحاسوبیة المستخدمة لتطبیقھ، والنتائج 
الواعدة في التجارب المعملیة، وفي الحیاة الواقعیة السیبرانیة. وقد كانت أغلب الجھود ذات الفعالیة في صد ھذه 
الھجمات، تتمحور حول زیادة عدد مستخدمین ھذا البروتوكول، مما یعني زیادة في استخدام شبكة تور، وبالتالي 
مضاعفة نسبة خلط البیانات التي تمر بشبكة تور. ولكن ھذه الجھود غالبا ما تفشل، عندما یقوم المستخدمون الخبیثون 
بالتركیز على مقدمین خدمة تور ذو االستخدام المنخفض نسبیا، وبالتالي تقلیل نسبة البیانات المختلطة، أو عندما تقوم 
بعض الحكومات ذو النظام الصارم بالتركیز على حلقة الوصل الوحیدة التي تربط بین المستخدم النھائي، وشبكة تور. 
في ھذا البحث، نھدف إلى كشف وتدقیق الطرق المستخدمة في تور لخلط بیانات المستخدمین، وتحلیل مدى فعالیتھ في 
صد الھجمات. أیضا، نقوم بعرض ثالث خوارزمیات تقوم بتحسین عملیة خلط البیانات في تور منذ خروجھا من 






As the Internet grows in size and users, many aspects of our lives start to fold around 
its center. The different services the Internet provides, and the advances in recent 
technologies, dramatically increase the potential of tasks we are able to exercise on it.  
From a simple question on a popular search engine, to industrial control systems, 
different principles of information security are being mandated on daily basis. For 
some, the assurance that their messages are received as-is without tampering, while 
others, focus solely on whether their messages were read by some third party during 
the transmission.  
 
A recent rising demand in today’s world is anonymity. No longer does a party requires 
the confidentiality of their messages only, but the assurance that the other end doesn’t 
identify them, by means of IP, geographical location, or time zone. Also, the inability 
of an observer to identify the different destinations this party is reaching out to. Hence, 
the increasing popularity of low-latency anonymity systems is being noticed nowadays 
in different fields of online-provided services, most notably Onion Routing Protocols, 
with a dominating percentage utilizing Tor [3]. Tor promises its users with the 
confidentiality and anonymity they’re seeking by introducing a multi-layer, multi 
nodes, encryption protocol that sparse your communication traffic around the web 
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before final delivery, and uses middle routing relays as encryption/decryption nodes, 
where a node is only aware of the previous or upcoming node in terms of metadata 
[IP, location, etc.], and a complete shadowing of the traffic content.  
 
The unique features Tor promises and provides for its users, derived a new field of use 
cases for different demographical sets. Users in oppressive regimes, such as China and 
Iran, can evade censorships and communicate liberally [1]. E-Commerce users can 
keep their history and shopping preferences private, against online marketing 
campaigns. Whistleblowers can freely communicate with law enforcements and the 
press without compromising their identities. Governmental agencies abroad can reach 
out to their headquarters without notifying host countries. Trade secrets can be 
securely transferred without alerting possible eavesdropping competition. Hackers and 
hacktivists can, unfortunately, conduct their destructive actions with an extra layer of 
confidence, such as the recent attack on The Hacker Group [2].  
 
Despite the promises Tor provides, and the complexity noted by its wide-spread 
infrastructure, several attacks [4, 5, 6, 7] have successfully de-anonymized some 
aspects of Tor, thus, compromising the most demanded aspect of it. These attacks 
differ in complexity, applicability in real world, and the required level of control on 
network nodes around the globe. While the most successful attacks are those relaying 
on traffic confirmation, where an adversary monitors traffic on both ends of 
communications, these attacks fail dramatically outside the environment of a lab. Even 
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larger-scale entities, such as ISPs and backbone support entities, can’t guarantee 
continuous monitoring of nodes outside their jurisdiction to preclude this kind of 
attack [8, 9]. 
 
However, attacks involving a local observer are considered more realistic and 
applicable to users of anonymity systems. A local observer is any entity that has 
control over (or can monitor) the traffic between the user and the first encrypting node 
of a Tor circuit. In a local coffee shop, this could be a script kiddie capturing all the 
wireless traffic; an intruder eavesdropping on your home router, an ISP monitoring 
your entire communication, or a system administrator with the proper tools to capture 
your traffic. Recently, attacks based on Website Fingerprinting (WF) [10] are 
considered most effective and realistic on Tor. WF is a special attack derived from 
traffic analysis that classifies and identifies websites based on certain characteristics 
these websites exert. The number of resources (files) the homepage of a popular 
website serves on an ordinary request, the sizes of these resources, the order of which 
they are served, or the timings between each response, are typical characteristics this 
class of attack utilizes to draw conclusions about the websites being visited. Recent 
WF attacks on Tor [8, 9, 11, 12, 13] have shown a surprising 57% of true positive 
detection rate in a closed-world setting, for a false positive rate below 1%. Some 
attacks claimed to reach a higher or more accurate results in an open-world 




However, WF is as accurate as the traffic its analyzing. The more noise introduced in a 
traffic, the difficult it becomes identifying a website. Furthermore, the more websites a 
user surfs, the harder it is to distinguish different streams. That is why Tor employs the 
use of algorithms which masquerades the traffic by either dividing them into a fixed 
width of 514-bytes data chunks, known as cells, or merging the data from multiple 
packets into a single cell. Additionally, Tor combines multiple TCP streams into a 
single circuit, and multiplexes those circuits into a single connection, which increases 
the level of complexity for an observer. Most of the literature work uses the ground 
truth of the data collection system to decide where to split the stream. Moreover, the 
algorithms implemented only accept as an input cell sequences that corresponds to a 
single web resource or page. 
  
In this research, we aim on exploring the internals of Tor multiplexer to truly 
understand the inner-working and conditions where the multiplexing applies, and fully 
measure the extent to which multiplexing reach. We aim to unearth a vague point of 
research that often overlooks the role of different streams composing a circuit. 
Additionally, we feel the urge to determine whether Tor accounts for streams 
randomization as it does for different circuits. Furthermore, we propose three different 
algorithms that can dramatically enhance the overall security of Tor, and provide a 
strong layer of resistance towards Websites Fingerprinting, and Traffic Analysis 
attacks in general. Specifically, our contribution is: 
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1- Analyze Tor multiplexing module, explain its interworking, and discuss its 
security implications. 
2- Identify the scenarios where Tor applies Multiplexing, or the lack of it. 
3- Identify the scenarios where Multiplexing is applied but with no additional 
security value. 
4- Introduce three different algorithms that enhances on the identified scenarios with 
lack of multiplexing or multiplexing security added value. 
5- Conduct empirical experiments that backup our findings in 2 and 3.  
6- Conduct empirical experiments that backup up our algorithms in 4. 
 
In the remaining of this section, we deliver a brief introduction on Tor, and formally 
define our problem statement, as well as providing a general overview of Traffic 
Analysis. In Section 2, we deeply explain the way Tor operates, and provide some 
technical insights on its processes. In section 3, we provide some recent related work 
on Tor’s fingerprinting in the literature. The familiar reader with the topic can skip to 
section 4. In section 4, we introduce the incentives and rationality of our proposal, 
demonstrate the mechanism of Tor circuits and multiplexing, and propose our 
improvement by presenting three different algorithms of streams multiplexing and 








Tor circuit is a collection of Tor Onion Routers (OR) distributed over the Tor network 
that aim to provide an encrypted end-to-end channel between a Tor user (client) 
utilizing an Onion Proxy (OP) and an Internet service, e.g. HTTP server, Tor hidden 
service, FTP server, or even a VPN server. A circuit is established incrementally by 
the client (OP), through the use of three Onion Routers (OR), where each two ORs 
exchange information independently of the rest of the circuit, to establish a one-to-one 
secure connection between them. While a circuit is intended to be used by a single 
client (OP) to carry as much services as required by the client, two ORs will only 
establish a single (TCP) connection among them at any time and will piggyback that 
single connection with as much circuits as required from different OPs.   
 
The same behavior is also observed between a pair of OP/OR, where a single outer 
TCP connection is established. Once a full circuit is established, an Onion Proxy can 
establish as many TCP streams as required on top of that circuit to consume Internet 
services. In essence, an observer of the traffic between two Tor Onion Routers will see 
a single TCP connection, that wraps around multi Tor circuits established by many 
Onion Proxies, where each circuit transmits many TCP streams from only a single 
Onion Proxy, heading to many Internet services. The analogy used in this section will 
























2.1 Introduction to Tor 
Tor is a low-latency anonymity protocol, based on Onion Routing, where a network of 
volunteers constructs a hard-to-follow route through the Internet, similar to when you 
want to throw off a tailgater [26]. There are four main components in a Tor network, 
namely Tor clients: an end user who wishes to establish TCP connections to other 
entities while keeping their identity anonymous, also referred to as Tor Proxies; Tor 
nodes: intermediate routing nodes that convey the clients traffic, also known as Tor 
Relays or Onion Routers; Tor Directory Server: similar in functionality to DNS 
servers, but uses a different mechanism; Tor Onion Services (previously hidden 
services): an Internet server that wishes to keep their identity anonymous from end 
users (Tor clients) and other entities while serving any sort of resources. 
 
Two possible use cases may occur when a Tor client wishes to establish a connection, 
depending on the end destination. If the client is aiming to reach a normal Internet 
server that doesn’t implement Tor (i.e. not an onion service), the client’s Tor software 
(Tor Onion Proxy) starts by consulting a Tor directory server. The server provides 
information about currently available Tor Relays (Onion Routers), network topology, 
and bandwidth information to the client. The client, then, chooses three nodes to build 
an encrypted circuit incrementally. That is, similar to a VPN server, the client starts by 
establishing a tunnel connection with the first node in the circuit, utilizing public key 
cryptography. It, then, uses this portion to extend the connection to the second chosen 
node, and finally, to the third. During that, the client exchanges symmetric keys with 
each node in the path (circuit) to carry on session encrypted communication. Once the 
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circuit is secured, the client can start establishing communication channels with 
different destination servers by building streams on top of the circuit.  
 
The process starts by encrypting packets in a layered approach where each packet is 
encrypted three times with the third, second, and first node’s key, in that order, 
resulting in an onion-like shape. Every node, then, peels off its respective layer of 
encryption to reveal the information about the next relay in the circuit, without 
compromising the contents of the original packets. Only the first node in the circuit 
(Guard node) knows the original sender (Tor client), where the last node in the circuit 
(exit node) can identify the final destination of the packet, and the content of the 
packet if SSL is not used by the end server. The simplest attack on Tor’s anonymity 
can be implemented by compromising both the guard and exit node, a statistically 
infeasible approach. In this research, we only focus on this use case of Tor, hence, no 
much emphasis will be given to the second scenario, and we will explain the general 
idea for the reader’s convenience.  
 
In the second use case, the Tor client wishes to connect to a Tor onion service. In this 
case, a rendezvous node is selected at random by the client. The client sends the 
selected rendezvous node through a three-relays circuit to a certain node on Tor 
network that knows how to reach the onion service. The node forwards the request to 
the onion service, which by turn establishes a three-relays circuit to that rendezvous 
point, thus, forming a six-relays Tor circuit. The client and service exchange required 
services, and the circuit is broken.   
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2.2 Keys and Authentication 
Each connection established between two Onion Routers or an Onion Proxy and an 
Onion Router must use SSLv3/TLS for link authentication and/or encryption; TLS is 
always preferred. For that purpose, a Tor Onion Router must first prove its identity by 
the use of Public Key Infrastructure, and must maintain a secure identity utilizing a 
collection of public/private key pairs. An RSA-1024 key is maintained as an identity 
key, and is used solely to sign certificates, documents, and the likes, that are issued by 
that relay. This is a long-term key that is maintained as well by the directory servers of 
Tor to reference that specific relay.  
 
An alternation of that key, is an ED25519 signing key that is used in later versions of 
Tor, and is also used to describe the identity of the node, however, is referred to as the 
master identity key, and is solely used to sign the third key. The third key is a 
medium-term ED25519 key, that is signed by the master identity key and is utilized 
for onion skin decryption (discussed below). Two other medium-term keys are used. 
While the first is an RSA-1024 TAP (onion key) that is used to decrypt onion skins, 
when accepting circuit extend attempts originating from the Onion Proxy (client); the 
second key is implanted as an EllipticCurve25519 key, that is used for the same 
purpose, and is referred to as an “ntor” (onion key). These two keys can be used 
interchangeably with the first key. Finally, a single short-term RSA-1024 key is used 
to negotiate point-to-point TLS connections, and is rotated much frequently, 




Furthermore, three ways are available for two Tor relays to authenticate themselves 
and establish a TLS connection between them. In the first method, namely certificates-
up-front, each relay provides its authentication certificate prior establishing a TLS 
connection, and as part of their initial TLS handshake. In the second approach, namely 
renegotiation, only the responder relay provides its authentication certificate, allowing 
the requester to authenticate immediately via a TLS renegotiation. In the third method, 
namely in-protocol, both relays utilize Tor protocol, after the initial TLS renegotiation, 
to bootstrap themselves to mutual authentication.  
 
In the first method, the initiator always starts by sending a two-certificates chain 
consisting of an X.509 certificate utilizing the short-term connection public key, and a 
second self-signed certificate announcing its identity key. The responder replies with a 
similar chain. In the second method, the initiator doesn’t send a certificate, while the 
responder provides a single connection certificate. Once the handshake is concluded, 
the parties renegotiate the handshake with each relay providing its two-certificates 
chain, as in certificates-up-front approach. In the third approach, a TLS connection is 
established in a non-conventional way where the parties exchange Tor specific data 
structures (known as cells) to establish a TLS connection, and to agree on connections 
properties beforehand, where they engage in relatively longer communication 







Cells are the building blocks of Tor and the smallest unit of communication, as they 
are utilized in every aspect of Tor establishment of connections, circuits building, and 
exchange of data. Cells are considered one of the strongest defenses Tor implements 
against Traffic Analysis attacks as they employ a fixed width of 514 bytes (512 bytes 
in older versions), that are mostly triple encrypted. A typical Tor cell will have three 
fields: CircID, a 4-bytes field that identify the corresponding circuit this cell associates 
to; Command, a 1-byte field having a numeric value ranging from 0 to 127 that 
describes the purpose of the cell; and Payload, a 509-bytes field that carries the 
payload of the cell, and comes in a variety of formats and structures, depending on the 
purpose of the cell, identified by the Command field. It’s worth noting that other 
structures of Tor cells are available, however, they are neglected due to their 
irrelevancy, restricted use to backward compatibility, and far less common use.  
 
Some common examples of the Command field values are 0 (PADDING), which 
indicates that the cell is being used for padding purposes; 1 (CREATE) which instructs 
the receiving relay to create a circuit; 2 (CREATED) which is an acknowledgment cell 
confirming the creation of a circuit; and 3 (RELAY) which is the most common cell 
type of Tor that is used for end-to-end data transfers. As mentioned earlier, the 
interpretation of the payload field is dependent on the Command field. A Command 
value of 0 (PADDING) indicates that the payload is not used and should be discarded, 
while a Command value of 1 (CREATE) suggests that the payload contains the 
handshake challenge. Similarly, a Command value of 2 (CREATED) indicates that the 
Payload is the handshake response. Of most relevance, a Command value of 3 
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(RELAY) instructs the receiving relay to further interpret the payload as another data 
structure, consisting of a Relay Header and a Relay Body. We will further display the 
internal structure of a Relay cell at a later stage. 
 
2.4 Circuit Establishment 
As mentioned earlier, an Onion Proxy (OP) incrementally create a circuit using at least 
three Tor Onion Routers (OR, relays, nodes, or hops). The process by which this is 
accomplished is delegate, and requires the use of a multi-spectrum range of cell types. 
In general, OPs send a CREATE cell to the first node in the path, such that the payload 
of the cell contains the first half of the handshake challenge. Immediately, that node 
responds with a CREATED cell that encompasses the second half of the authenticated 
handshake.  
 
The handshakes mentioned here corresponds to Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol, and utilizes the different sets of public/private keys illustrated earlier. To 
extend a circuit past the first relay node, the Onion Proxy sends a Relay cell (explained 
at a later stage) that has a subtype of EXTEND. This cell instructs the receiving node 
to send, yet, a freshly crafted CREATE cell to the next node in the path, which in turn 
responds with a CREATED cell. It’s worth noting the second node in the path is not 
aware of the OP’s identity at this point, and is only familiar with the previous OR in 




Figure 2 illustrates the process of circuit building in a formal manner, which also 
accounts for more than three nodes. The steps below are performed by the circuit 
creator (Onion Proxy). 
 
Figure 2 Formal process of circuit creation 
 
 
This process concludes the mechanism by which an Onion Proxy is able to create a 
Tor circuit that spans over three or more Onion Routers. By now, the Onion Proxy is 
maintaining a list of N routers that constitute the circuit, each of which have 
negotiated a shared key indirectly with the Onion Proxy (with the exception of the first 
router R_1), and the OP is now able to establish TCP streams to end destinations by 
crafting and routing special Relay cells across the path. 
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2.5 Relay Cells 
Relay cells are the most common cells to traverse the Tor network, that is, they are 
mainly used to transfer end data (client to server or vice versa) or participate in some 
special circuit management tasks, e.g. extending circuits beyond the first router, 
tearing down circuits, etc. Within a circuit, the Relay cell is used to communicate 
messages between the Onion Proxy and the last Onion Router in the circuit path (i.e. 
the Exit Node), in addition to being the tunnel that pipelines end servers TCP streams.  
 
Other nodes in the circuit path only route the relay cells to the next hop in the path, 
without being able derive clues about their contents, given that they are encrypted, and 
are set to fixed widths. Another observation is that while streams are only initiated by 
the OP, the exit node is able to initiate commands of its own, wrap it in a Relay cell, 
and route it towards the OP. The OP is able to perform the same as well. The payload 
of a Relay cell consists of five headers, in addition to a Data section that is interpreted 
differently based on the Relay cell headers (not to confuse this with the general cell 
header discussed earlier). 
 
“Relay Command” is the first of those headers, and is a 1-byte field having a 
numerical value ranging from 1 to 15. Values observed from 32 to 40 are reserved for 
Tor hidden services and are of slight value to this research’s scope. The second field is 
referred to as “Recognized”, and is a two-bytes field that is set to zeros in the plain 
(unencrypted) Relay cell (further discussion below). “StreamID” is a two-bytes field 
that hosts a unique end-server stream ID that is arbitrarily generated by the OP to 
differentiate cells pertaining to different TCP streams. All Relay cells having the same 
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Stream ID are considered to be belonging to the same end server TCP stream. Stream 
ID is used in congestion with Circuit ID to uniquely identify cells. Additionally, no OP 
is allowed to use a Stream ID of zero, as that ID is reserved to cells that affect the 
entire circuit rather than the single stream.  
 
“Digest”, is a four-bytes field and is computed as the first four bytes of the running 
digest of all the bytes that have been destined (or originated) from the hop this Relay 
cell is intended to (either the exit node or OP). The combination of a correct digest in 
the Digest field and the Recognized field equaling zero, annotates the respective cell 
as successfully decrypted.  The “Length” field is used to identify the length of the 
“Data” section, that is, the actual payload of the Relay cell. The remaining of the Data 
section beyond the identified length should be padded with zeros.  
 
Some common examples of Relay commands values are 1 (RELAY_BEGIN) which 
indicates the OP intend to establish a new TCP stream; 2 (RELAY_DATA) an end-to-
end TCP stream data (e.g. HTTP request/response); 3 (RELAY_END) which 
communicates the client or server intent to terminate the TCP stream. A common 
example of the use of RELAY_END cell is TCP FIN packet which can originate from 
either the client, server, or an intermediate firewall. Other important commands are 
RELAY_EXTEND (6) and RELAY_EXTENDED (7) which we’ve touched upon in 
the previous reading, and are used to indicate OP request to extend the circuit, and a 





A client intending to open a new anonymized TCP stream, must first choose an 
established open circuit that has an exit node that is able to connect to the final 
destination (specified by that node exit policy). The OP must then generate an 
arbitrary stream ID that is not yet utilized on that circuit, and starts off by constructing 
a Relay cell of type RELAY_BEGIN (command is set to 1). The payload of that cell 
should comply to the expected structure of a RELAY_BEGIN cell i.e. the exit node 
will want to interpret an ADDRPORT field, that is null-terminated, in addition to an 
optional flag of 4-bytes. The ADDRPORT field represents the concatenation of a DNS 
hostname and a TCP port of the end server (destination) the OP wishes to connect to 
(e.g. www.google.com:443). 
 
The optional flags are not heavily utilized by Tor at the moment, and are currently 
used to indicate the possible use of IPv6. Upon receiving that cell, the exit node will 
attempt to resolve that host name to an IP address, and established a new TCP 
connection to the desired port. It’s worth noting the Tor defends against DNS blockage 
censorship implemented by some organization and countries, in addition to 
anonymizing DNS requests/responses by relaying that task to the exit node instead of 
the Onion Proxy (client). A common use of the RELAY_END cell is when the exit 
node can’t resolve the communicated hostname, or is unable to connect to the desired 
TCP port, and issues a RELAY_END cell to the OP. Otherwise, the exit node replies 
with a RELAY_CONNECTED cell and awaits further commands from the OP. Note 
that the RELAY_CONNECTED cell holds the resolved IP address of the destination 
in its Data section for the OP to carry further verification should she wishes. Once a 
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connection is established (as indicated and communicated by the 
RELAY_CONNECTED cell) the OP and exit node start tunneling the underlying TCP 
stream by packaging them in RELAY_DATA cells.  
 
2.7 HTTP Scenario 
Regardless of the end server application protocol, and whether it implies the use of 
TLS/SSL, the OP/Exit node will treat the application data in a similar manner. For the 
sake of this writing, we will demonstrate a typical HTTP scenario. The browser starts 
by creating a typical HTTP GET request, and package it within a transport layer 
packet (TCP packet). The browser, then, forwards that packet to the Onion Proxy, 
which in turn strips the content out of the packet and package it in a Tor Relay cell of 
type RELAY_DATA. Depending on the content size of the received TCP packet, the 
OP might choose to further divide the TCP payload among multiple cells, or combine 
multiple TCP payloads into a single cell, the former being the most probable.  
 
Recalling that an OP maintains the list of the three routers (or more) in the circuit path 
with their corresponding shared keys, the OP starts encrypting the cell payload 
(including all relay cell headers and Data section) by the shared key of the exit node 
(outermost), and work its way with more encryption layers utilizing the keys of the 
previous hop in the circuit path, ending with the first Onion Router in the path 
(nearest). At this point, a packed cell of 514-bytes, triple (or more) encrypted is ready 
to be sent and routed through the circuit. The OP wraps the cell in a TCP packet, 
which is encrypted a fourth time with the established connection key between itself 
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and the first node, and send it across the wire. The fourth encryption layer is not totally 
related to Tor mechanism, but is a result of establishing an SSL/TLS channel between 
the two nodes.  
 
Upon receiving the cell, the Onion Router perform two decryption operations; the first 
utilizing the shared key between itself and the previous node as a result of using the 
shared SSL/TLS channel, while the second using the shared key that resulted from the 
CREATE/CREATED cells exchange when building the circuit. Again, this OR 
encrypts the cell with the key pertaining to the established secure channel between 
itself and the next node in the path, and send it across the wire. The receiving node 
performs two decryptions as well; the first utilizing the shared key between itself and 
the previous node, and the second with the shared key between itself and the OP.  
 
Finally, this OR encrypts the resulting cell (which is still encrypted by the exit node 
key) and pushes it to the exit node through the wire. The exit node, perform similar 
two-iteration decryption, and perform a sanity check on the resulting cell, by 
computing the digest and verifying that the “Recognized” field is all zeros. The OP, 
then, extracts the Data field content from the relay cell payload, verifies it has an open 
stream corresponding to the stream ID in the cell, packages the payload into a new 
TCP packet, and pushes it across the established connection with the end server. From 
the perspective of the end server, it’s the exit node who made that connection entirely 
without the involvement of the OP. The iterative process of encrypting/decrypting is 
what gave Tor its name, as the multi-layer encryptions resembles those layers in an 
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onion, hence the name, The Onion Routing. The HTTP scenario described in the 
previous paragraph is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 



















The term “Website Fingerprinting” was first coined in the year 2002 by Hintz [10]. He 
founded the idea of identifying websites by means of utilizing the different resources a certain 
website serves, while he referred to those resources as objects. In his research, he assumed 
that browsers will load each individual resource in a different TCP stream, and hence, each 
stream can be identified from a local observer point of view, through a tuple of 
source/destinations IP addresses and port numbers. However, Hintz was targeting a specific 
encrypting web proxy called SafeWeb, and only experimented on 5 websites achieving a 
detection rate between 45% and 75%.  
 
Sun et al. [14], similarly, used the technique of Hintz in website fingerprinting with respect to 
object sizes. However, instead of using objects’ sizes identified by TCP stream, they adopted 
the use of packets counting between subsequent blocks of requests. Each website is identified 
by a multiset of object lengths, which is then compared to an unknown multiset obtained from 
a target traffic by applying Jaccard’s similarity. A threshold of similarity value is set, and a 
result above that threshold is considered as a match. In their work, they constructed a database 
of 2,000 websites fingerprint and tried to identify them among a test sample of 100,000 
websites. They managed to identify 75% of those, by setting a similarity threshold of 0.7, with 





Liberatore et al [15], utilized a different approach to identify visited websites. Their approach 
takes a step down in the OSI model by analyzing packet sizes and the frequencies they appear 
at. In their work, they represented the traffic flow as a vector of packets’ sizes frequencies, 
where each visit to a website will produce a histogram of packets’ sizes frequency. 
Additionally, the employed the classification techniques of Jaccard’s similarity and Naive 
Bayes to classify those vectors. In their work, they relayed on the University of 
Massachusetts’s traffic by identifying the top visited 2,000 websites and were able to achieve 
a detection rate of 73% using Jaccard based classification.   
 
As the need for anonymity systems became more demanding, more researches were focused 
on migrating the aforementioned Website Fingerprinting (WF) techniques and applying them 
to implement attacks on anonymity systems, most notably, Tor [3]. Shi et al. [16], for 
example, combined the techniques discussed in Hintz [10] and Sun et al. [14] and detailed a 
WF attack on Tor. In their work, they identified an interval as a time period occurring in a 
traffic capture without a change in flow. They, then, started tracking the number of packets in 
each interval, and representing the whole traffic trace as vector of intervals.  
 
The vector identifies a website fingerprint by specifying the number of intervals with two 
packets, the number of intervals with three packets, and so forth. Additionally, they enhance 
the fingerprint of each website by multiple visits to confirm their findings. Finally, the 
acquired profiles of fingerprints is compared to a traffic trace of unknown websites, and the 
similarity is computes using cosine similarity. In their empirical experiment, they managed to 




Panchenko et al. [9] generalized their detection mechanism to both Tor and JAP [17], another 
popular anonymity system. In their approach, they used support vector machines (SVMs) by 
utilizing multiple traffic trace features. The traffic trace is represented by a sequence of 
packets lengths, where each flow direction is marked with either positive or negative values. 
Moreover, and to increase the classification accuracy, they injected additional features to the 
traffic flow when certain conditions are triggered. For example, the size of the packets in each 
interval is injected whenever the traffic direction changes and is referred to as “size marker”; 
the number of packets in each interval is injected whenever an interval ends and is referred to 
as “number marker”; total transmitted bytes, etc.   
 
In their empirical work, they examined their technique in both open-world and closed-world 
settings. In the former, they used the same 775 websites that were used in [11] and were able 
to reach an accuracy rate of 30% using only the basic variant, and an accuracy of 54% when 
resorting to all features. As for the latter, they conducted the open-world experience on a set 
of 5,000 websites chosen randomly from Alexa [18] and considered amongst the top 
1,000,000 websites in the world, in addition to five censored websites. The censored websites 
were identified with an accuracy rate falling between 56% and 73%, with a false positive rate 
of less than 1%.   
 
The previous work discussed so far were all experimented under laboratory conditions. This 
resulted in more researches that aimed to pinpoint weaknesses when this work is applied in 
real world scenarios. Juarez et al. [19] work recognized significant differences in the 
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environment and users’ behavior that impose a challenge on these techniques to work in the 
wild. Specifically, they identified six assumptions that previous work made, that limits the 
chances of carrying out realistic attacks: 1) Template websites that use similar or identical 
resources. 2) Closed-world experiments never tested with websites outside the monitored 
pages. 3) Attacks are vulnerable to stale training. 4) The assumption that users browse the 
web sequentially and not in parallel. 5) The adversary knows the beginning and end of a web 
page or a resource. 6) Most work ignores background traffic (OS, session control, browser 
plugins, etc.).  
 
This led to more work that aims to eliminate these limitations in order to carry the attacks in 
the wild. For example, several researches [9, 20, 21] discussed tackled the second assumption 
and came out with an attack that can achieve a true positive rate of 85% in the open-world 
settings with no limits on web pages’ number. Wang et al. [22] also tackled assumptions 3 to 
6 by presenting a set of tools that augment current WF attacks to operate under realistic 
conditions. They defined the full traffic trace of a user as a full sequence, where each web 
page or resource is expressed as a cell sequence. To tackle the splitting problem (the process 
of converting a full sequence into cell sequences) they employed the use of two methods: 
Time-Based Splitting, and Classification-Based Splitting. In time-based splitting, a threshold, 
tgap, is defined as the optimal time gap separating two cell sequences (different web pages).  
 
That is, if two cells are separated by a time difference of tgap or more, they are considered to 
be belonging to two different cell sequences. The output of time-based splitting is, then, 
passed to the classification-based splitting to cover any case of two or more pages separated 
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by a time difference less than tgap and were mistakenly identified as one cell sequence. They 
further attempt to reduce background noise by means of classification and counting, and 
conclude that noise elimination is difficult, however, so as introducing deliberate noise in the 
traffic due to technical limitations in Tor, especially when using Tor browser. In fact, a small 
error in noise removal, could lead to a much larger one in page identification.  
 
More recently, Website Fingerprinting is becoming a hot area of research in the past few years 
[34-38]. Panchenko et al. [35] realized that website index pages, frequently change, especially 
with those popular websites on Alexa top-X lists, and due to the dynamic nature of the 
modern Internet. Hence, they built a classifier that utilized more than 50 varying non-index 
pages of a website to represent its signature. The classifier applies ten iterations of cross 
validation to determine if a monitored website was visited, and achieved a near 86% accuracy 
rate. They also employed the use of several tactics to improve on the accuracy and success 
rate of their classifier, but felt short on subsequent visits to the same website, where the 
dynamic nature and the use of sessions, dramatically deforms a collected signature.  
 
Herrmann et al. [37] conducted a thorough study of Website Fingerprinting with a wider 
scope that includes Tor, JAP, OpenVPN, Cisco IPsec-VPN, and OpenSSH. For a single hop 
system, their naïve bayes classifier outperforms Liberatore’s approach and correctly identifies 
more than 90% of the requests in a closed-world settings of the same 775 sites mentioned in 
[9]. However, the accuracy dramatically decreases to below 3% when used against multi-hop 




Giovanni et al. [39] considered a different approach in circumventing Website 
Fingerprinting attacks, by implementing the defense controls at the servers’ side, 
which is more appealing to those employing Onion Services in their infrastructure, in 
addition to introducing a lightweight client side extension, that eliminates the need for 
mass deployment. They managed to demolish the long standing assumption of WF 
attack scalability, by only focusing on Onion Services, since they are 1) service size is 
trivial compared to the Web size, thus easier for an adversary to build a fingerprint 
database of all available onion services and 2) they usually contain and host more 






MULTIPLEXING TOR TRAFFIC 
Despite the active research field on the topic of Tor and anonymization in general, we 
find the lack of documentation with respect to the way Tor multiplexes circuits and 
queue TCP streams concerning. As described previously, Onion Proxies (OP) 
establishes circuits by randomly selecting three Onion Routers (OR) distributed across 
Tor network. The selection criteria is made based on the bandwidth of the respective 
ORs and the associated exit policy. Following, an OP will build a circuit on top of 
those selected nodes to create a path for cells to be routed. A circuit is always 
dedicated to a single OP, but can tunnel multiple TCP streams heading to different 
destinations. 
 
Additionally, each two ORs on the path will establish a single Tor connection between 
them, and if any two circuits, established by two OPs, happen to use the same two 
ORs in a row, those circuits will have to share this single Tor connection. According 
to the latest Tor statistics obtained from Tor metrics [29], the active number of Tor 
users directly connecting to Tor network peaked 2,000,000 by 2017, while the number 
of Tor Onion Routers (relays) is little over 7,000. Hence, we can safely infer that 
connections between ORs will usually be shared between multiple circuits, especially 
those ORs offering high-bandwidth capabilities, and will likely be a more preferred 




In other words, each OR will establish simultaneous connections to multiple other 
ORs, while only maintaining a single connection to each individual OR, and 
piggybacking that connection with as many circuits as required by OPs selecting those 
ORs in their paths. Additionally, each circuit will usually tunnel multiple TCP streams 
(of end-applications using Tor) given the design aspects of modern web sites, where a 
single page is referencing many resources, e.g. HTML, CSS, JavaScript, etc. and each 
resource requiring its own TCP stream. Also, each cell has a fixed width of 514-bytes, 
and is structured with a header containing meta-data and a payload. Upon cell arrival 
to a given OR, the respective OR will decrypt a layer of the cell, and parses the 
headers to identify the appropriate circuit to route this cell to. Recall that an OR is 
participating in many circuits and requires identifying cells’ associated circuit. 
 
Upon circuit identification, the OR, maintaining a different queue for each circuit that 
was built on a path containing this OR (circuit queue), will write the cell to the queue 
corresponding to that cell. Reardon [24] identified this process of cell parsing and 
writing to the queue as negligible time, cost-wise, and hence presented our research 
with an opportunity discussed in following sections. The moment a circuit queue is 
populated with a cell, it is marked as an active circuit, and vice versa, i.e. marked 
inactive upon de-queueing of all cells. Additionally, an OR will maintain a single 
output buffer for each established connection with other individual ORs, where data 




Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between circuit queues and output buffers. In this 
example, four different OPs selected OR1 as their guard node. Thereafter, two OPs 
selected OR3 as the following (middle) node, while the other two OPs selected 
different nodes (OR2 and OR4) for their paths. After circuit establishment, OR1 will 
end up with creating 4 circuit queues, each representing the different circuits that were 
built using OR1 as a node in the path. Only cells coming from circuit one, will be 
populated to the queue designated for circuit one, similarly, circuits two, three, and 
four will only populate queues designated for their own circuits. However, since OR1 
is only connected to 3 other Onion Relays, it will only create 3 output buffers, one for 
each Tor connection established between itself and the succeeding node in the path. 
 




The reader can immediately spot the correspondence between the circuits’ queues and 
output buffer. Since an OR can only sustain a single connection to the next OR, but 
still maintains multiple possible circuits with their queues that share that connection, a 
need to multiplex those queues to the output buffer arises. When the output buffer is 
available for more data to be written, the OR will choose one from the available active 
circuits, and start moving as many cells from its designated queue to the output buffer 
to fill the available room. The process by which an OR decides which active circuit to 
move cells from to the output buffer, is referred to as Tor circuit scheduling. In the 
previous figure, whenever OR3 output buffer has some room available, OR1 must 
invoke its scheduling algorithm to decide whether to move cells from circuit two or 
circuit three queue. This results in creating a multiplexed connection between nodes 
OR1 and OR3, where the single connection carries cells from both circuits. 
 
Earlier versions of Tor employed the use of Round Robin to select from active circuits 
pool. Tang et al. [25] discussed the performance overhead of utilizing Round Robin 
fashion on Tor multiplexing and argued that bulky transfers, such as those 
downloading large files, or connecting to multiple peers (such as BitTorrent) are 
always prioritized over burst connections, such as those resulting from users surfing 
the web. In their research, they showed that by employing a different scheduling and 
selection algorithm (i.e. a multiplexing algorithm), they can insure that burst 
connection are almost always privileged, and that their cells are moved to the output 




They proposed an implementation of a more judicious selection criteria based on the 
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) of circuits. In their approach, they 
favored those circuit queues with less sent cells over a period of time, by assigning a 
cell counter to each queue and building a metric of selection. The metric kept 
readjusting the average value of sent cells, while decaying over a set period of time. 
When selecting from active circuits, the circuit queue with the lower metric value will 
be the one to push cells from, thus increasing the overall performance of burst 
connections, while holding those with bulky transfers (or more active) queues for a 
little longer. 
 
Indeed, this approach appears to induce randomization to a certain degree, especially 
when considering the vast amount of Tor users, and the tendency to select nodes with 
higher bandwidth. However, the motivation behind their approach is purely focused 
towards performance improvement, hence it lacks the required degree of 
randomization to disperse traffic analysis attacks. First, the approach heavily relies on 
the coexistence of multiple circuits on a single connection between two ORs. This 
exposes those circuits that are relying on two consecutive low-utilized nodes, or those 
circuits that are uniquely utilizing a Tor relay.  
 
One might come to think that due to the vast amount of users, and their dependency 
over much lower number of nodes, that this probability is far from occurring. 
However, consider the link between the Onion Proxy (client) and the first node in the 
path. As discussed earlier, this link employs a single connection, and is rarely seen to 
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host more than a circuit. This is the case with every Tor user that wishes to connect to 
the anonymity network (except in cases where a pool of users share a single Onion 
Proxy). While Tang et al. approach works well against traffic analysis attacks in the 
distributed Tor relays, it ceases to provide the same level of protection when the 
relationship between the output buffer and the circuit queue becomes one-to-one. In 
fact, it’s this link that organizations and oppressive regimes have control over, rather 
than the distributed network over the globe. 
 
Another point of concern is streams. Recall that each circuit will probably be tunneling 
multiple TCP streams. Also, recall that an OR will read from the circuit queue as First-
In-First-Out. This implies that Tor will be sending out cells to the wild in the same 
order as they are received from the browser, and the only mechanism of defense would 
be the existence of multiple circuits thriving to utilize the link. In our empirical work, 
we show that this assumption is true, and that browsers behavior with respect to 
stream construction plays a major role in traffic analysis attacks. 
 
Despite that Tor multiplexing wasn't implemented as a security measure, rather an 
operating requirement, we aim to examine the potential by which it can aid to increase 
the overall security of Tor. In the following sections, we discuss a scenario where 
EWMA acts as a pipeline, and the employed scheduling algorithm ceases to work. 
Additionally, we propose our approaches to enhance this algorithm by introducing, 
yet, another multiplexing degree on the streams level and discuss its implication from 
a security perspective. 
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4.1 Single Circuit Scenario 
 
As discussed, Tor multiplexes circuits whenever two circuits or more select the same 
two consecutive nodes in their paths. This leads to a scenario, where the two circuits 
compete to utilize the same link between the two nodes, since Tor will only maintain a 
single link to the next node at a time. Tor resolves this by invoking a scheduling 
algorithm that fairly decides which circuit will have the priority to utilize that link. 
However, most Website Fingerprinting attacks are executed by a local observer who 
possess the ability to monitor the link between the OP and the guard node. 
Additionally, a typical Tor user will mostly be running a single circuit and initiating as 
many TCP streams on it, until that circuit expires. 
 
Since a single circuit exists, Tor will still invoke its multiplexing algorithm (circuit 
scheduling), however, it will only have a single circuit to choose from. Additionally, 
the cells in this circuit are ordered in the way they are received from the browser. 
Figure 5 show a typical use case of Tor, where a user browses to a certain website. The 
browser first loads the HTML pages and parses it for references to other resources 
(CSS, JS, images, etc.). The browser, then, executes a series of GET requests, each 
corresponding to a resource on the page, which yields an equivalent number of TCP 
streams to be opened. Tor arranges those stream (GET requests) in the order they are 
received from the browser, and packs them in cells. Those cells are considered 
belonging to the same circuit, and are populated into that circuit's queue. Whenever 
Tor is ready to send more cells to the guard node (i.e. output buffer of guard node has 
some space), it will invoke its scheduling algorithm to select among the active circuits. 
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Since a single active circuit exists, cells will move from the circuit queue to the output 
buffer in FIFO order, i.e. as received from the browser. 
 
 
Figure 5 OP Browsing using one circuit 
 
 
Unless the Onion Proxy (client) established more than a circuit, the previous scenario 
will always be the case. A single active circuit is available to move cells from, thus 
eliminating the randomization induced by multiplexing. Additionally, the same 
behavior will be observed when the guard node responds to client's requests (e.g. 
HTTP response). The cells packing the requested resources will come ordered as the 
web server has processed them, and as the exit node received them. The guard node 
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will have a single circuit queue resulting from the OP establishing the circuit, and a 
single output buffer corresponding to the single connection established between them. 
 
Not only will this case occur on this link. Consider a lowly utilized relay anywhere on 
the path. Due to its low utilization, there will be a minimal number of circuits built 
using that relay, and hence, a higher chance that this relay will also maintain one-to-
one relationship between the participating circuits' queues and the output buffer to 




4.2 Approach Motivation & Proposed Algorithms 
In this section, we propose our enhancements on Tor’s algorithms for streams 
queueing. We state the approach motivation and rationale behind our proposal that 
lead us to bring about these algorithms. Finally, we describe our multi-approach 
enhancements over the currently implemented algorithms by suggesting three different 
implementations that induce additional randomization to Tor, with different 
performance overhead.  
 
 
4.2.1 Approach Motivation 
 
So far in this writing, we have deeply investigated, discussed, and displayed the most 
crucial attacks the literature has identified on Tor’s Traffic Analysis. As discussed, 
Tor differentiate itself from traditional VPN and Proxy-based approaches in general, 
by transferring TCP packets and streams from their default behavior and appearance. 
Tor packages TCP streams into fixed-width cells, and performs massive 
transformation by either dividing TCP packets contents across multiple cells, or 
merging TCP packets payload into a single cell, depending on traffic distribution. 
Yet, Tor also multiplexes circuits that are tunneling different TCP streams into a 
single connection, thus increasing the challenge for the observer. 
 
Despite that, the rich literature showed that all of those defense mechanisms suffer 
from a great shortcoming, they are systematic and predictable. If we look at Tor as a 
black box, and when we supply a certain input to that box, the result is always 
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predictable with a high certainty in both open-world and closed-world settings. A 
user browsing only amazon.com, will cause Tor to grab specific resources in a 
specific order, not only that, but an observer can predict how many cells are going to 
be exchanged in each direction. Some have gone to further lengths, and identified the 
exact splitting points that Tor follow. 
 
Additionally, we’ve discussed Tor’s multiplexing algorithms, and how they operate 
with respect to circuits established by different OPs. Also, recalling how circuits are 
built, the Onion Proxy will choose an exit node that has an exit policy that allows for 
connecting to the remote destination. Once a circuit is built, it’s very rare the case 
that an OP is faced with a situation where he has to create extra circuits or rotate his 
exit node to accommodate a new destination. The OP will keep utilizing the same 
circuit for new destinations. 
 
 Hence, from our observation, we concluded that circuits multiplexing is eliminated 
at the link connecting the OP with the first node in the circuit path (Entry/Guard 
node). The reason as stated, is the lack of circuits to multiplex. The OP and the first 
node in the path will only establish a single connection (which is the norm), but build 
a single circuit on that connection, resulting in a First-In-First-Out queue, with no 
multiplexing. 
 
This led us to determining that the only factor missing from this complete system of 
defenses is randomization. Randomization has always been a critical characteristic 
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that appeared in all security algorithms, whether in the fields of encryption, hashing, 
or even security applications. Hence, we sifted through the different design aspects 
of Tor in attempts to find the perfect venue to implement randomization. In the 
following sections, we highlight on this effort, and discuss with further details our 




4.2.2 Proposed Algorithms  
 
To thwart against the most successful traffic analysis attacks, we believe that stream 
randomization is the key. Recall that Reardon [24] highlighted that cell parsing and 
circuit identification from cell headers, is a time-negligible process. Also, recall that 
one of our research objectives is to introduce a randomization characteristic to Tor, 
with little overhead in performance, or none at all. Hence, we started sifting through 
the design aspects of Tor, in attempts to identify the perfect location where 
randomization can be introduced, and seamlessly integrate with Tor while maintaining 
our design goals inline. Additionally, we wanted that change to cover all possible 
scenarios of Tor usage, such as those on low utilized links between Onion Routers, 
and the observable link between an Onion Proxy and the first Onion Router.  
 
Streams were the key. By introducing a stream randomization mechanism in Tor, we 
will guarantee the alignment of our goals towards the proposed change. From the 
perspective of an OR, streams are meaningless. Recall that a cell payload is encrypted 
and is only viewable by the latest node in the circuit path (exit node). Also, recall that 
Stream ID is part of relay cell Data section, within the cell Payload section. Hence, for 
an intermediate OR, a cell will be forwarded down the path regardless of its stream. In 
our solution design, we hypothesis that intermediate relays will have no objection in 
receiving cells out of order, as ORs only require the knowledge of a Circuit ID. 
Intermediate relays are all those nodes participating in the circuit path, excluding the 




For the above mentioned circuit queues, Tor implements what is called a “Simple 
queue”, a representation of a basic linked list. The simple queue is only exposing 
pointers to its head and tail. Additionally, a single implementation of a queue popping 
algorithm is available, namely CELL_QUEUE_POP. The queue expects every 
element to be of type Tor cell, and offers a single pointer for each element, that is, next 
element. Additionally, the queue is only traversable by accessing the head, where an 
iterator can access the next element using the next pointer. Finally, the queue doesn’t 
allow selective access by index.  
 
As TCP packets arrive from the browser, and in the context of a Relay Data cell (e.g. 
HTTP GET, a TCP ACK, HTTP response, etc.)  Tor strips the content out of the TCP 
payload and evaluates its size. If the content can fit the boundaries of a cell payload, 
while accounting for relay cell headers, the content is not split, otherwise the content is 
split among two cells. On the other hand, if the content is small enough, Tor will 
examine the following packet in the same stream to test if the two TCP packets can be 
fit into a single cell.  It’s worth mentioning that Tor accounts for different streams, and 
respects the order they arrive at. 
 
Consequently, Tor packs the resulting payload into a new cell, and populate all 
required headers, such as Stream ID, Circuit ID, Length, etc. Then, the payload is 
triple encrypted as detailed earlier, and the new packed cell is pushed to the tail of the 
queue. At this point, it’s not possible to induce any information about the cell, as all 
cells in the queue will look similar, due to encryption, and fixed-width. Upon the 
49 
 
invocation of the multiplexing (scheduling) algorithm, and the determination of the 
active circuit to read cells off, Tor will access the head of the selected queue and 
invoke the CELL_QUEUE_POP method, in its single offered implementation. The 
pointers are then updated, and the following element becomes the new head of the 
queue. 
 
In our approach, we suggest three algorithms to manipulate the behavior by which Tor 
pops cells from the circuit queue. Two of these methods relay on modifying the 
behavior by which Tor pops cells while maintaining the structure of the queue intact, 
while the third redesigns the queue structure. Also, it’s important to note that we 
considered other approaches that depend on modifying the behavior of queueing the 
cells (as opposed to popping them), however, a quick evaluation showed the need to 




4.2.2.1 First Approach  
 
This is the easiest approach to implement and induces the highest cost on performance. 
In this approach, we propose a new popping method that randomly selects from the 
available streams in the queue, instead of always popping the first element. However, 
we have to cater for in-stream order, that is, we don’t want to break the underlying 
application’s protocol, by popping later cells from the stream, before flushing earlier 
cells. We can intermix the streams as we wish, but we can’t intermix within the same 
stream. 
 
Also, recall that Tor maintains a stream ID of zero, for those cells that affect the 
entirety of the circuit. Those cells that belong to stream zero, are order-sensitive, and 
have to be popped in the exact order they are pushed to the queue. The changes 
induced by this approach only introduce a newly implemented method to pop cells in a 
random order. Basically, we are adding a new queue access method with no other 
changes in Tor. Additionally, this approach is backward compatible. Here is an 
example of normal scenario that illustrates the algorithm in work. 
 
1- When a request is made to pop a cell, we scan the whole queue and identify all 
streams that are in the queue. 
a. For the sake of this example, say we identified 5 streams. Note that to get 
this information we had to traverse (say) 100 cells currently in the queue. 
b. For each identified stream, we record a pointer to first cell of that stream 
in the queue and build an index matching each stream with the cell.  
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2- We select a random number between 1 and 5 (number of identified streams). This 
is the stream number randomly selected. 
3- By consulting with the created index mapping, we pop the first cell in that stream. 
4- Reconnect Tor Simple Queue by updating the popped cell’s previous item “next 
pointer”, and the popped cell’s next item “previous pointer”. 
 
Note that the scan and building of the mapping, is being performed every time a cell is to 
be written to the output buffer, i.e. needs to be popped. However, this approach is mess-
free, a randomly selected stream will always provide a cell to be popped. Recall that this 
approach will scale up when you have many queues (a queue for each circuit) in a Tor 
Onion Router. Also, the index mapping created above, is locally used in the newly 
created access method, and can’t be reused. This is to avoid further modification of Tor, 
and eliminate the need for mass re-deployment. 
 
Also, recall stream zero, and the need to push cells from that stream in order. A 
modification to this approach is made to accommodate for cells belonging to stream zero. 
When we perform the initial scan of the queue, we stop at the first occurrence of a stream 
zero, and select randomly from the streams available prior to stream zero. When the first 
cell of the queue is a cell belonging to stream zero, we pop it immediately without further 







Figure 7 Illustration of the first approach 
Figure 6 First approach pseudocode 
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4.2.2.2 Second Approach 
 
In the second approach, we implement a two-fold solution to enhance on the 
performance of the first approach. The first part is performed before every cell push to 
the queue, while the second part naturally occurs before popping a cell from the queue. 
On average, this approach costs logn, however, worst case scenario is same as in 
approach one, that is n. 
 
PRE PUSH: 
1- Before a cell is pushed to the queue, we note the Stream ID. We build a mapping 
of Stream IDs, and the number of cells in the queue with that stream. 
a. If this is the first time we see the stream, we append it to the mapping. 
b. Otherwise, we increment it’s counter by one.  
2- We push the cell normally to the queue. 
 
PRE POP: 
1- Select a random number between 1..n where n is the length of the created mapping 
(Stream ID/count). This is the stream number that we will pop the next cell from. 
2- We insure that the counter of that stream is > 0. If it’s equal to 0, it means no more 
cells in the queue are available from that stream. This is a mess, we select again. 
a. This mess is on the scale of our built mapping which corresponds to the 
number of streams, not the number of cells in the queue. 
b. That stream ID is removed from the mapping to avoid further mess. 
3- We start iterating Tor queue and examine the stream ID of each cell. 
54 
 
4- We pop the first cell in the queue that has a stream ID of the randomly selected 
stream and rejoin the queue. 
5- Decrement the counter in our mapping by one. 
 
This approach will not modify Tor queue, but only the accessing methods. However, it 
has the potential of scanning the full queue, e.g. we only have one cell of the selected 
stream towards the end of the queue. Moreover, it also has the potential of being much 
faster than the first approach on average. This method only adds one queue accessing 
(and popping) method, in addition to a global mapping to maintain the streams and cell 
counters. This approach is also backward compatible. Figure 8 illustrates this approach. 
 
 




4.2.2.3 Third Approach 
 
This should be the fastest, most efficient, and thus, requiring the most changes. In 
principle, we abandon Tor simple queue and create a new one with a much efficient data 
structure, such as linked list, hashmap, etc. The queue will be two dimensional, where the 
first dimension is the stream number, and the second dimension is the actual cells 
belonging to that stream. Before pushing a new cell to the queue, we examine the 
availability of the stream in our queue. If the stream is available, we append the new cell 
to that stream second dimension. Otherwise, we create a new entry for that stream in the 
first dimension, and push the cell to its second dimension. An example queue illustrating 
the idea of this approach can be seen in Figure 9. 
 
Again, when we want to pop from the queue, we select a random number between 1..n, 
such that n is the length of our first dimension. Immediately, we pop the first cell in that 
queue since they are already in order. Also, this approach involves creating a new data 












EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Testbed  
In this section, we describe the different testbed setup we used throughout the 
experiment. In general, all machines used in the experiments and testing were virtual 
machines hosting Linux Ubuntu 16.04.2 (Xenial Xerus). Additionally, the VMs were 
allocated a single core, each, with 8 Gigabytes of memory. Moreover, we utilized a 200 
Megabits Internet connection. Finally, the Tor version installed was alpha 0.2.9.8 
 
5.1.1 First Setup 
In this setup we utilized one virtual machine to host Tor, and it was configured to connect 
directly to the internet, and consequently, to Tor network. The setup is illustrated in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 First setup illustration 
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5.1.2 Second Setup 
In this setup, we used two virtual machines to establish connections to Tor. The first 
machine is a regular end-user machine, that has a Firefox version 50 installed, alongside a 
network sniffing application, namely tcpdump. Additionally, a second virtual machine 
was setup to host Tor, and exposed its services to the local network. Further details will 
be displayed within each experiment. The setup is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 




5.2 Tor Multiplexing at Onion Proxy  
 
From Tor design documentation, investigating the source code of Tor, and throughout 
the literature, we know that Tor is supposed to multiplex cells. However, by invoking 
many test cases of Tor, we weren’t able to reach a concrete evidence that Tor is indeed 
multiplexing cells. Additionally, we needed to deeply understand how the 
multiplexing is performed, and to what extent. We needed to find out if Tor pushes 
streams as they are received from the browser, or does Tor perform some sort of 
multiplexing on the same circuit, i.e. multiplex streams.  
 
To achieve this, we decided to design a series of different tests, by instrumenting Tor 
to print and log certain parameters required to establish a fair comparison of circuits 
and streams. At this point, we only had an intuition about the behavior of Tor, and we 
needed to establish ground truth and develop a sense of understanding of the 
multiplexing behavior.  
 
5.2.1 First Experiment: Tor General Behavior 
 
Our first experiment was broad and aims to define the general picture of Tor while 
logging as much information as required to enrich our understanding. To accomplish 
this, we wanted to graphically interpret the relationship between different streams, and 
examine if we can detect any kind of similarity or repetition in Tor’s behavior. The 
existence of any repeated behavior would indicate that Tor is systematically 
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distributing and selecting streams to be written out the wire, while the lack of such 
pattern could indicate the opposite, among other possibilities. 
 
5.2.1.1 Scenario and Implementation 
 
To implement our first experiment, we instrumented Tor to printout two parameters 
for every cell created; i.e. Circuit ID and Stream ID, in the same order as Tor is 
creating and processing those cells, but before they are pushed to the queue. The 
output is to be directed to a collection of text files, where each file represents a circuit, 
and each line of that file documents the stream number of the respective cell, and in 
the particular order Tor created that cell. Also, recalling that the first cell of a Tor 
stream is a DNS query relayed to the exit node for resolving, we instrumented Tor to 
printout the domain name from the first cell of a stream, filtering on the previously 
explained RELAY_BEGIN command in the Relay cell headers, and utilizing the 
ADDRFIELD of its payload.  
 
This will allow us to print the destination of each stream and create a mapping 
between Stream IDs and their destination, thus enabling us to filter out those streams 
that are of irrelevance to our experiment, such as circuit control, directory servers’ 
connections, etc. and focusing on streams heading to destinations of our choosing. 
Consequently, and after each run of Tor, we expect to have multiple text files, each 
representing a circuit created by the Onion Proxy, and each file containing a variety of 
streams tunneled through that circuit. Additionally, we will able to link each stream to 




Recall that we are testing for streams multiplexing from Onion Router perspective, 
hence, we want to push as much data out from the client to observe the multiplexing 
behavior. This is as opposed to pulling data towards it which will only show the results 
of multiplexing from the entry node, i.e. first node in the circuit, as that node will be 
the one multiplexing the incoming streams into the single connection towards the 
client. Therefore, uploading relatively large files will naturally allow us to observer 
that relation in question. 
 
Moving forward, we created a custom web application that allows for a file upload in a 
single stream. The web application is implemented using NodeJS “http” module to 
build a simple webserver and an HTTP request/response component, in addition to 
utilizing “Formidable”, a known NodeJS library for parsing forms, handling file 
uploads, and allowing for single stream uploading by default. From the client side, we 
crafted a set of three pairs of files, sizing 1 Megabytes, 5 Megabytes, and 100 
Megabytes, respectively. Each file was populated with random characters to reach the 
required size using a Perl script. Finally, a simple bash script was created to simulate a 
browser upload of two files utilizing curl (a command line tool to for client-side HTTP 











Following we launched Tor with our instrumentational logging, and initiated the 
upload of each pair of files of the same size together. In this experiment, we aimed to 
create a racing condition between the upload of the two files, thus allowing us to 
illustrate the behavior Tor will exert on the competing two streams, and hopefully 
observe a systematic behavior in the output streams ordering. For each pair of files, we 
repeated the experiment ten times and collected the output files, resulting in 30 runs, 
where each pair of files of the same size were tested together.  
 
Recalling that we organized the output to print each circuit’s streams in an individual 
file. To our surprise, each run resulted in a single output file. This is the first indication 
that Tor Onion Proxy (client) only built one circuit, and utilized it for both files 
uploads, in addition to other Tor activities (circuit building, key negotiation, etc.). By 
resorting to our created mapping of Domain Names/Stream IDs, we were able to 
cleanse the output files from all Tor inner communications, and focus solely on traffic 
heading to our website. This resulted in a data file that has only two streams that are 
alternating in the order their cells were created in Tor.    
 
To prepare the data for plotting, we used a Python script to transfer the output files 
from a listing of streams in the order they appeared in Tor, to data points 
representation to be plotted on a diagram. We set our X-Axis maximum length to 100 
(for representational purposes only), then, we start iterating through the streams, and 
we assign an incremental value for each stream, to represent its location on the X-axis, 
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starting by 0. Initially, the stream value on the Y-Axis is 0, and we don’t increment it 
yet. Whenever, we reach a 100 on the X value, we increment the Y value by 1, and 
reset the X counter. This transformation resulted in a data file where each occurrence 
of a cell belonging to either streams is given a position on the (X,Y) axis. 
 
Moreover, we used Gnuplot [28] (a command line graphing tool) to illustrate the 
intermixing of the streams. As an input, the Gnuplot script will take the Python 
processed data file, whereas it will output a diagram showing the order and 
intermixing of streams, where each stream is given a unique color. Furthermore, 
consecutive points of the same streams are represented by a line connecting them. 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 show a sample output diagram representing one run of a pair of 
files of the same size being uploaded. 
 














As the reader might have concluded, the three diagrams shows no relation or similarity 
among them. This was the case with all the 30 runs we have conducted, as different runs 
of the same pair of files show similar result every time, however, no similarity is 
observed across runs of different sizes. In Figure 12, where the file sizes are relatively 
small (1 MB each), we can notice that the first stream (i.e. upload operation) 
represented in blue concludes much faster than the second stream (in green). However, 
when we look at Figure 14, where the two files being uploaded are much larger (100 
MB each) we can see a pattern of alternation. Each stream is given an equal time share 
to upload a portion of its content. 
 
This observed behavior of alternation is not induced by Tor. In fact, those alternation 
and allocation of bandwidth are controlled by the OS, and specifically by the bash 
process that initiated this upload, where each process is allocated an equal share of 
resources in quantum-basis. For the first case of 1 MB files, the first file was able to 
upload most of its content in the quantum given, hence showed no intervention on 
following quantum. We will continue to show in following experiments that this 
behavior is induced by the bash process (i.e. the browser). So far, and from the figure 
illustration, and since we haven’t observed any similar pattern when two streams are 
competing to utilize the link between OP and the first OR, we are assuming that Tor 
hasn’t induced any multiplexing on the two streams before pushing the cells to the 





5.2.2 Second Experiment: EWMA Multiplexing Behavior  
 
To further examine the possibility of streams multiplexing, we had to understand the 
effects induced by EWMA circuit multiplexing algorithm developed by Tang et al. 
[25].  
 
5.2.2.1 Scenario and Implementation 
 
We wanted to perform a comparison between the order of cells before entering the 
queue, and as they are leaving the queue (i.e. written to output buffer). We could 
easily identify cells before entering the queue, as those cells are freshly created and are 
not encrypted yet, hence their stream IDs are still exposed in plain text. However, 
recall that cells go through three rotations of encryption as they are populated to the 
queue, and unless we had access to the Exit node, we couldn’t possibly tell which ones 
were popped first. 
 
Hence, we resorted to identifying the cells through the use of hashing. Initially, we 
record the stream numbers cells correspond to, in the order we received them from the 
browser, which also corresponds to the order of cells being pushed to the queue. This 
is in a similar fashion to the first experiment, however, we don’t resort to multiple 
circuit output files, as we concluded that the OP will only create a single circuit. After 
a cell is received and its stream is recorded, we let Tor perform the three encryption 
67 
 
rotations it requires, and just before the cell is pushed to the queue, we calculate the 
hash of the entire cell in its triple-encrypted format, and append it with the respective 
stream number in the output file. Again, we utilize the first cell of the stream to 
identify the final destination of the cell, i.e. the domain name. 
 
Additionally, the mapping between each cell and its hash is stored in a hashmap data 
structure, that will be used to identify cells as they are exiting the queue. Since Tor is a 
network application and is delay sensitive, and since the need to use hashing is 
experimental and for identification purposes only, we couldn’t compromise to use an 
expensive hashing algorithm. Hence, we elected to implement a simple, yet effective, 
stream-rotational hashing algorithm that doesn’t induce collisions frequently. The 
pseudocode of the used hashing algorithm is showed in Figure 15, which is an 
implementation of the algorithm used in SDBM a public domain implementation of 
ndbm (the UNIX database), in addition to being used Berkeley DB [33]. 
 
 




By the end of this process, we expect to have the order of cells as they are pushed to 
the queue, in addition to a hash for each cell representing an identification of it in a 
single output file, as well as having the same information populated to the hashmap 
data structure.  
 
Thereafter, we instrument Tor to print the order of cells being popped from the queue. 
Recall that Tor utilized a Simple Queue with a single access method, i.e. POP HEAD. 
We modified the code of the POP HEAD method to perform the reverse operation, 
that is, by invoking the same hashing algorithm on every cell being popped from the 
queue. Upon hash calculation, we consult the built hashmap to identify the stream 
number each respective cell being popped belongs to utilizing its hash as a lookup, and 
record the stream number in a dedicated output file. By the end of this process, we 
expect to have an output files listing all the stream numbers in the order the respective 




As in the previous experiment, we prepared three files of three sizes, one, five, and ten 
Megabytes, and used Perl to populate their contents with random characters. Recall 
that in this experiment we want to confirm and compare the order of cells before and 
after the circuit queue, hence, we will only upload a single file at a time. Following, 
we launched Tor with our instrumentational logging, and initiate the upload of each 
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single file. We repeated the experiment ten time for every file, resulting in a total of 30 
runs. However, we ended up with 60 output files, each two for a single run.  
 
In the first type of output files we observed an entry for each cell processed by Tor, 
where that entry represents the stream numbers those cells belong to, in addition to the 
calculated hash of each cell. In the second type of output file, we observed an entry for 





We are now ready to establish a comparison between the order of cells coming to Tor, 
and the order of cells leaving Tor. Similar to our first experiment, we utilized the 
Stream ID/Domain name mapping and cleansed our data files from irrelevant stream 
numbers. Needless to say we didn’t have to induce any more processing on the data 
files, or had the need to illustrate them graphically, as both output files, for each 
respective run, were identical. This is the solid proof we required to conclude that Tor 
doesn’t induce any stream multiplexing from the EWMA multiplexing algorithm and 








So far, we were able to observe that Tor doesn’t induce a notable systematic re-
ordering of streams by examining incoming traffic from the browser, also we were 
able to confirm that Tor EWMA multiplexing algorithm doesn’t induce any re-
ordering on cells entering and exiting the circuit queue. However, we needed a more 
comprehensive test that can illustrate the full behavior of Tor. To do this, we needed to 
record the behavior of the browser at first, then compare it to Tor behavior.  
 
Unfortunately, we are faced with the dilemma of unequal comparison. Recall that Tor 
will either split TCP packets contents into multiple cells, or will merge smaller ones 
into a single cell. However, given our test case scenarios of file uploads, we are certain 
that Tor will only perform the former (i.e. splitting) given that TCP packets will be 
fully populated with the contents of the file to be uploaded, up to the Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) the environment allows for. Hence, we had to focus our 
attention on identifying those cells that correspond to a single TCP packet to be able to 
establish a fair comparison, that will allow us to illustrate TCP streams versus their 








5.2.3 The Dictionary Experiment 
 
To achieve this, we designed an experiment dubbed “The Dictionary Experiment”, 
where we aim to explore the relationship between a single TCP packet and the 
different Tor cells that this packet splits up to.  
 
5.2.3.1 Scenario and Implementation 
 
In our scenario, we wanted to upload a single file to our developed website, capture 
both the TCP packets and Tor cells, and establish a method to compare each cell to a 
TCP packet. By the end of this experiment, we should be able to identify which cells 
correspond to a single TCP packet, and be able to conclude a factor of distribution 
between a single TCP packet and the different cells it splits up to. 
 
 To implement this, we had to expand our testbed setup to be able to capture plain text 
packets as they are leaving the browser, in addition to capturing the content of cells in 
Tor. Moreover, we can’t intercept data from the same machine having both the web 
browser and Tor Onion Proxy, since any traffic sniffing application will only intercept 
data as they are passing through the link, i.e. after Tor. 
 
To tackle this, we decided to separate the browser from the Onion Proxy, and 
implement a standalone Tor Proxy setup. By setting up two virtual machines, we 
installed and configured Tor on one of them, while allowing Tor to execute in 
72 
 
listening mode. That is, Tor will act as a SOCKS proxy, listening on the virtual 
machine for connections coming to a dedicated port (i.e. 9100). When connections are 
established to the SOCKS proxy on that port, Tor will continue to operate normally by 
tunneling those connections through Tor circuits. The client, on the other hand, will be 
utilizing another virtual machine where the browser of that machine will be configured 
to use Tor as a SOCKS proxy.  
 
On the client machine, we intercepted the network traffic coming out of the browser 
using tcpdump [30], a known command line utility for intercepting traffic on the local 
machine. We configured tcpdump to sniff and record all outgoing traffic to our Tor 
proxy server, and store the output to a PCAP file. Additionally, we instrumented Tor 
to print the contents (payload) of each and every cell in a dedicated output file, 
alongside the stream number this cell associates with. Similarly, on the client machine 
we developed a Python script utilizing a library named “python-dcap” [31] that will 
extract the payload of each TCP packet from a given PCAP, in a dedicated output file. 
The script will traverse each packet in a PCAP file, filter out any control packets, such 
as TCP SYN/ACK packets, in addition to any non-TCP traffic out of the result, and 
finally dump the text content of TCP packets to a file. After each run of the 
experiment, we expect to have: 
1- An output file on the client machine containing the payload of each TCP packet in 
a separate line. 





To prepare for the experiment, we had to bring about a method that will make every 
TCP cell unique to avoid false-positive rates. Our file to upload, had to have non-
duplicate entries, which randomness may or may not guarantee. Hence, we decided to 
use the English dictionary. In this experiment, we build a set of 26 files, where each 
file contains words from the English dictionary that starts with a different letter from 
the English alphabet. The dictionary was obtained from a GitHub project that provides 
the English words in a text file [32]. When uploading a file to our previously designed 
website, we expect every TCP packet, and the corresponding Tor cells, to contain a 




We conducted 26 runs of the same experiment, each utilizing a different alphabetical 
file. The experiment resulted in 26 PCAP files on the client machine representing the 
traffic generated by every file upload, and 26 output file on Tor proxy server, 
representing the payload of every cell Tor created for that respective upload.  
 
Consequently, we executed our Python script on every PCAP file, which resulted in 
additional 26 files, each having the contents of every TCP packet in a separate line. In 
principal, the generated output files from the Python script, had the exact content of 
the originally uploaded files, separated by TCP boundaries represented by new lines. 
On the other hand, and on Tor Proxy Server, we had a similar output of 26 files, 
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corresponding to each uploaded file, however, since cells accommodate far less data 
than a TCP packet, we had more lines on the output file representing the boundaries of 
a Tor typical cell. 
 
Furthermore, we developed an additional python script that takes as an input two 
different files and initiates a comparison between them. Starting with the first file, the 
script iterates over every line and stores it in a buffer, and with every iteration, the 
script starts iterating over every remaining line of the second file, continuing from the 
previous iteration position. The script attempts to identify the number of lines in the 
second file that fully appear in the buffer, and exits with the first mess. We, also, 
maintain a distribution factor average variable, that stores the average number of lines 
in the second file, that fully appeared in the buffer. Additionally, we maintained two 
counters from the number of lines in each file.  
 
Finally, we executed the script with every two output files from each run as an input, 
i.e. the output file representing TCP packets content, and the output files representing 
Tor cells payloads. By the end of every run, the distribution factor average was always 
calculated to three, and the number of lines in the TCP output file, was always triple 
the number of lines in Tor cell files. Additionally, from our observation, we noticed an 
MTU of 1,500 bytes, where each TCP packet in the experiment is loaded with 1400 







This led us to a conclusion, that for every TCP packet that is fully populated under 
MTU of 1500, Tor generates exactly 3 cells, where the last cell is 80% populated, with 
20% of padding, as Tor doesn’t include other data from the next TCP packet in the last 
cell. Figure 16 shows a sample of some files that were uploaded in this experiment. 
The chart shows three data sets corresponding to the original file size, the number of 
TCP packets that generated from uploading this file, and finally the number of Tor 
cells generated from the same file upload operation. 
From the graph above, we can witness that a single TCP packets generates three Tor 
cells, and by increasing the number of TCP packets, Tor doesn’t piggyback cells with 
different TCP packets, given that the packets obey the 1500 bytes MTU, and are fully 
populated, which is typical in file upload scenarios. 




5.2.4 The Full Fledge Experiment 
 
Recalling that our intent is to examine the reordering and multiplexing of streams, and 
picking up where we left off before the Dictionary experiment, we wanted to observe 
the full behavior of streams, from the moment they are created in the browser, up until 
Tor sends them off the wire.  
 
5.2.4.1 Scenario and Implementation 
 
In this experiment, we wanted to upload several files at once, and record the ordering 
of TCP streams, both at the browser side, and at Tor side. Recall from the EWMA 
experiment, we already observed that Tor doesn’t change the order of packets before 
and after the circuit queue. Also, recall from the Dictionary Experiment, that Tor will 
generate 3 cells from every TCP packet. By now, we also know that those cells will 
align with every corresponding TCP packet, and that additional cell’s capacity will be 
filled with padding. 
 
Our setup in this experiment will be similar to the previous one, i.e. the client and Tor 
will be hosted on different virtual machines. We will continue to use tcpdump to 
record the traffic at the client’s machine and produce a PCAP file. However, we will 
be utilizing a mixed setup between the EWMA experiment and the Dictionary 
experiment at Tor’s side. Since we want to compare the intermixing of streams at the 
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very edges of a file upload (browser and Tor), we will record the order of streams as 
cells are being moved out from the queue to the output buffer. That is, we will utilize 
the same hashing algorithm to identify encrypted cells’ streams, and record their order 
in an output file, by emphasizing on the built hashmap from un-encrypted cells 
entering the queue. Additionally, we will also be printing the contents of every cell in 
a dedicated file alongside its associated stream. 
 
However, since we already observed the correspondence between TCP packets and 
cells, we are no longer interested in observing them again in this experiment. Also, 
recall that we are only interested in the intermixing of streams, i.e. those switching 
points when the current outgoing packet/cell belongs to a different stream than the 
previous packet/cell. Hence, and for the sake of this experiment, we will be 
normalizing the data output, by reducing all packets/cells occurrences between 
streams’ switching to a single TCP packet and the corresponding three Tor cells, i.e. 
those packets/cells appearing just before the switching. Our comparison will be based 
on two points: 
 
1- Insure that the last TCP packet captured in the client before a stream switch carries 
the same content as the last three cells before a stream switch in Tor. 
2- The streams are ordered in the client capture the same way they appear in Tor, by 




We needed to intercept data coming out from the browser, and label each TCP packet 
with a unique identifier according to its stream. This is because Tor will also label 
streams randomly during runtime (recall Stream ID), and we need to establish a 
mapping between the two labeling. For the identifier, we used TCP source port 
number, since we know that our application accepts single streaming for each file 
upload, and every TCP packet will be labeled according to its TCP source port as its 
stream identifier. 
 
From the client machine, we created a total of 10 files, each sizing to 1 Megabyte, and 
filled them using a Perl script with random characters. There was no need to use a 
dictionary approach, since the comparison is to be performed upon every switching 
and on a single TCP packet, hence, a collision is statistically infeasible. Again, we 




We conducted 9 different runs, where in the first run we uploaded two files 
simultaneously utilizing our previously developed bash script, and we added one more 
file in each consecutive run. That is, the first run had two files of 1 MB being 
uploaded at the same time, while in the second run, three files of 1 MB were uploaded 
at the same time, etc. Each run ensued a PCAP file on the client machine resulting 





Additionally, we developed a Python script on the client machine utilizing the same 
Python library (python-dcap) used earlier, to parse the PCAP file. We wanted to 
traverse each packet in the PCAP file, and output a unique label identifying the stream 
number each packet associates with, in the same order the browser pushed these 
packets out, while filtering out irrelevant packets. As mentioned, the label used is the 
stream source port number. Upon executing, the script will output a single file where 
each line of the file represents the unique stream identifier the respective packet 
belongs to, in the order the packet appeared in, alongside the TCP packet content 
(payload) the respective packet has.  
 
Finally, an additional Python script was developed to conduct the ultimate 
comparison. In this implementation, we pass the two output files resulting from 
processing the PCAP, and Tor cells. The script will start traversing both files at the 
same time but with a different pace, i.e. each packet iteration will also iterate three 
cells, while noting the unique label identifying each entry, the packet and cell (source 
port number versus Tor Stream ID). Upon the change of label, i.e. stream switching, 
the script will buffer the contents of the last TCP packet before the stream switch, and 
compare it to the previous three cells contents, similar to the Dictionary Experiment. If 
those match, we know that both streams are aligned at this point, and we output both 




On the other hand, if a single packet didn’t match the three cells in content, we 
immediately break and exit the application marking the two files with a discrepancy, 
and identifying a possible change of stream ordering. We continue the same 
comparison through the whole file. At the end of every run, we are presented with a 
single output that lists the order of the streams in the browser side, next to the 
corresponding cells stream from Tor’s side. 
 
5.2.4.3 Findings  
 
After executing the script on the output results from all nine runs, none of the files 
caused the script to cease its execution, in an indication that the streams are aligned. 
The nine runs all resulted in a complete output that can account for all streams’ 
switching, and insure that the switching induce by the browser, is what will continue 
through the life cycle of a corresponding Tor stream. Also, this gives us the required 
evidence that it’s the browser’s behavior (curl in these experiments) that controls the 
order by which Tor will write cells out the wire, in a First-In-First-Out approach. 
 
The following two figures, Figure 17 and 18, illustrates the behavior observed in this 
experiment. In Figure 17 we show the output produced by uploading three files 
simultaneously, and the correspondence between each TCP stream and Tor cells, in 
addition to illustrating the order those streams appeared in. Note that the chart starts at 
the top left corner and moves to the right as time progresses, while wrapping around to 
the next line, when edge of the chart is reached. Each entry labeled “TCP Packet” is a 
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summarization of all the TCP packets that continuously transferred before a stream 
switch occurs, whereas every entry labeled “Tor Cell” represents the same with 
respect to Tor. Figure 18, illustrate the same, but with the last run of 10 simultaneous 


























Figure 18 The intermixing of 10 TCP streams resulting from 10 file uploads where each stream is represented 
by a different color 
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5.3 Experiments on Proposed Algorithms  
 
In the previous section, and as the different spectrum of experiments have shown, we 
now have concrete evidence that Tor doesn’t multiplex cells from the perspective of 
an Onion Proxy (OP), but instead, Tor follows whatever order of streams the browser 
throws at it. Tor will follow a simple FIFO approach, at the client side to handle the 
order streams arrive in. Hence, we decided to further invest on the analysis of Tor 
multiplexing by attempting to introduce streams randomization on the same circuit. 
 
In section 4.2, we displayed three proposed approaches to achieve that, while 
emphasizing on the benefits of each. Recalling that the first approach was the most 
expensive in cost (time-wise), yet the simplest to implement, we decided to implement 
it first. In the following experiments, and as opposed to the previous experiments, we 
want to test the behavior of Tor multiplexing on a smaller scale, and gradually 
increase our complexity as we progress with results. Hence, we will be testing the 
multiplexing algorithms on web browsing (GET requests), instead of file uploading. 
 
5.3.1 Ground Truth 
To establish our ground truth, we wanted to start off with a controlled environment 
instead of testing our algorithms in the wild. Hence, we developed a simple website that 
will allow us to observe the behavior of cells, and record the order of streams before 
applying our algorithm. The website was developed using “NodeJS”, and utilizing on 
the aforementioned “http” module. The website only serves a simple HTML page, were 
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we initially include two external resources, a CSS and a JavaScript files. Recalling the 
default behavior of HTTP, where the browser will fetch the HTML page, parses it for 
external resource, and then initiates as many required TCP streams to fetch those 
resources. 
 
Following, we instrumented Tor to print the URL of the requested resources, in the 
order Tor received them from the browser. Additionally, and similar to our multiplexing 
experiments, we hashed the cells that corresponds to those requests and built a hashmap 
of every cell, and the URL requested by each respective cell. Finally, we modified the 
CELL_QUEUE_POP function to lookup the URL requested by every encrypted cell as 
they are leaving the queue, and instrumented Tor to print the URL as well. 
 
 We started Tor and used Firefox to connect to our developed website multiple times, and 
observed the order by which resources are requested. After ten runs, we confirmed that 
the order induced is persistent across all runs, and that the resources are being fetched 
with the same order in every run. Moreover, we started increasing the complexity of our 
scenario by including more external resources in the HTML page gradually, and again 
conducting 10 visits to the website with each resource addition by adding an additional 
picture (resource) to the HTML page, and observing the order. We kept on repeating the 
experiment until we had an HTML page with five external resources.  
 
After each run, we observed that Tor is sending out cells, in the same order as URLs are 
being requested by the browser, which is in direct alignment with our discovery in the 
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multiplexing experiments. Figure 19 shows the observed order of the streams, and 
illustrates the order requested by the browser, and the order observed from cells leaving 












To examine and experiment with the first approach, we implemented a C function, 
namely CELL_QUEUE_POP_RANDOM, according to the algorithm listed in the first 
approach in section 4.2. The function was placed in Tor src/or/Relay.c class, which 
implements most of the queue functionality. Additionally, to make effective use of our 
function, we modified Tor function “channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit”, and 
replaced the call to CELL_QUEUE_POP function, with a call to our own implemented 
function. 
 
The function “channel_flush_from_first_active_circuit” is the only function in Tor that 
calls CELL_QUEUE_POP, hence we confirmed that every subsequent need of Tor to 





In this experiment, we repeated the same actions taken in the Ground Truth, by utilizing 
our developed website. Again, in each subsequent trail with a certain number of external 
resources, we repeated the experiment for ten runs to insure consistency of the results. 
Figure 20 illustrates the results induced of applying our algorithm, while only illustrating 







As figure 19 illustrates, our algorithm succeeded in inducing a degree of randomization 
on Tor. By implementing the first approach, we managed to change the behavior of Tor 
to add an additional level of randomness to streams on the same circuit. For example, in 
the first trial, we conducted 10 runs (4 are shown), and in every run, we witness an 
alternating order of streams requesting the resources “test.css” and “test.js”. In the first 
run, we see that modified Tor sends the cell requesting the “css” file first, where in the 
Figure 20 Illustration of applying the first approach algorithm to Tor 
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second run, it’s requesting the “js” file first, similar to the 3rd run, and contrasting with 
the fourth.  
 
Also, in the third trial, where we increased the level of complexity to host five external 
resources on the HTML page, we observe that modified Tor induces a severe level of 
randomization on the cells heading out with URL requests. Modified Tor creates an 
unpredictable behavior of multiplexing, which increases with the number of streams 
composing a circuit. Hence, we can observe that the added randomization managed to 
create a non-systematic, and unpredictable behavior of fetching resources, by alternating 
the order of which streams are arranged and multiplexed inside a circuit. By doing so, we 
insured that a classifier will not observe a consistent behavior of traffic patterns to build a 
fingerprint of a website, specially when the number of resources increases to 10 or more, 
which produces a factor of magnitude of websites fingerprints.  
 
In our simple website implementation, with 4 resources (3rd trial), a classifier would 
previously build a signature for this website based on the number of cells traversed in 
each direction, and the boundaries of a cell. However, by introducing a stream-level 
randomization, we are now forcing the classifier to conduct tens of runs to obtain a total 
of 24 signatures, each representing a different order of fetching those resources. 
Furthermore, consider the home page of amazon.com. On average, loading the page fir 
the first time, results in over 250 resources being loaded to your browser. A classifier that 
previously had to collect a single signature for that website, is forced to create 3.2 x 10492 
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
As we witnessed from the results of our experiment, we now confirm that Tor doesn’t 
induce any multiplexing on cells from the Onion Proxy (Client), due to the single 
establishment of a circuit. Tor will only invoke its randomization (i.e. multiplexing) on 
streams in cases where a Tor node has more than a circuit. We have shown, by 
experiments, that Tor’s cells will follow the same order as the browser initiating TCP 
streams and in accordance to the TCP packets forming those streams, and that cells will 
merely be smaller data containers. 
 
Additionally, we discussed how streams multiplexing on the same circuit induces a high 
level of unpredictability, a consequence that will persuade much longer observation time 
from an attacker or a classifier to confirm a website visit. By proposing three different 
approaches of stream randomization in Tor, we implemented one algorithm and 
performed various test scenarios, that indicate Tor’s ability to multiplex streams to a 
certain extent. However, stream randomization by manipulating cells in their queue, has 
shown a limited success to four streams only, and may require more research resources to 






6.1 Threats to Validity 
Unfortunately, our implemented approach ceases to succeed beyond four streams. Once 
we increase the number of external resources in the HTML page beyond 4 resources, we 
start to observe multiple timeouts in Tor. After deeply investigating the reasons behind 
those timeouts, we noticed that the Onion Proxy (OP) starts receiving timeout requests 
from the exit node. Immediately then, the OP retransmits the requests multiple times, 
until the exit node refuses to accept further connection, as an internal defense against 
brute force attacks. 
 
The OP, then, tears down the circuit, and starts building a new one, utilizing a different 
exit node. Unfortunately, the behavior is repeated with the new exit node, and Tor fails to 
send the requests. Since we don’t have access to the exit node, we tried to investigate the 
matter from the web server perspective, utilizing some heavy, low-level, debugging 
messages. We noticed that beyond four streams, the web server enables HTTP pipelining, 
a technique recently becoming exponentially popular. In HTTP pipelining, the client 
(browser), doesn’t send consecutive HTTP requests, and wait for each response prior 
sending the next one, instead, the browser sends all requests at one, and waits for the 





Since the matter is closely related to HTTP pipelining, we think that further research will 
sail us away from our original objective, of implementing a stream randomization at the 
client side. We fear that investing more resources on this research, would induce changes 
that are not backward compatible, and would require a sudden upgrade of millions of Tor 
users and relays around the globe. A consequence that doesn’t outweigh the benefits 












Figure 21 HTTP Pipelining Illustration 
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Additionally, since the second and third approach of our proposed algorithms, are merely 
an enhancement to the performance of the first approach, and doesn’t introduce a major 




6.2 Future Work 
In future work, we recommend seeking other approaches to randomizing streams. One 
could think of instrumenting Tor to create more circuits at the OP, and forcing different 
streams of the same session to follow different circuits. Hence, Tor, by default, will 
multiplex the streams into the single connection linking it with the Guard node. However, 
such approach requires deep investigation of the performance overhead that might be 
induced of streams following different routes, and take into consideration the utilization 
level of intermediate nodes. Another possible approach to induce randomization, is from 
the browser side. One could think of developing a browser extension that: 
1- Disables HTTP pipelining. 
2- Buffers the outgoing requests and randomizing their forward order. 
This will cause no further modification to Tor, where the randomization algorithm will be 
moved to the browser side, and Tor will naturally process streams in the order they are 
received from the extension.  
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